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Togo - 2015 
 
Dirk Kohnert 
 
The presidential elections of 25 April resulted in a victory for the incumbent, Faure 
Gnassingbé. Thus, he secured his third five-year term, strengthening the autocratic grip 
of the Gnassingbé-clan, which had been in power since 1967. The institutional and 
constitutional reforms that would have been required for free and fair elections and 
which the opposition parties, civil society and international donors demanded, were 
postponed indefinitely. Nevertheless, the international community declared the elections 
free and fair, given their security interests in the region. Economic growth remained 
stable at about 5% p.a., although economic growth rates were not inclusive and 
benefitted the few. The business climate improved considerably. 
 
 
Domestic Politics  
 
Presidential elections had initially been envisaged for March and opposition and civil 
society groups pressed all the more urgently for constitutional and institutional reforms 
of the electoral system, which were assessed as a necessary precondition for free and 
fair elections. According to an Afrobarometer survey in October 2014, 85% of the 
population were in favour of procedural reforms, calling for the reestablishment of a 
limit on presidential terms, which the late head of state Gnassingbé Eyadéma had 
abolished in 2002 by an illegitimate amendment of the 1992 constitution. However, 
government and opposition could not agree on either the scope or the timetable of the 
reforms. The ruling party and the Constitutional Court had made it clear already in 2014 
that they would not be interested in electoral reforms before the presidentials and that 
they considered the Accord Politique Global (APG) of 2006 between opposition and 
government on these reforms no longer as binding. 
After two weeks of futile consultations, the draft electoral reform law was 
rejected at the end of January. Although the Constitutional Court had ruled that the polls 
should be held between 17
 
February and 5 March, Minister of Territorial Administration 
Gilbert Bawara announced that the elections would be delayed till mid-April, citing 
mainly logistical issues.  
Opposition groups did not object because they felt that they would benefit from 
additional campaigning time, but were divided on the question of whether to boycott the 
elections, given these unfair conditions. In February, the ‘Comité d’Action pour la 
Renouveau’ warned the opposition and the international community not to participate in 
an “ongoing electoral charade”. The opposition increasingly moved away from putting 
forward a joint opposition candidate, which was the only way to challenge the 
incumbent effectively. Given the biased electoral system, discord within the opposition, 
and the strength that the ruling party ‘Union pour la République’ (UNIR) had acquired, 
a victory for any opposition candidate seemed unlikely. Shortly before the elections, 
even the ex-president of the transitional parliament of 1991, former Archbishop of 
Lomé Mgr. P. F. Kpodzoro, who was still highly regarded by the Togolese, fustigated 
the present constitution as an ‘one-armed bandit constitution’ (‘constitution manchot’) 
which did not reflect the truth and reconciliation process (31. March). 
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In February, international and national human rights organisations, including the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR), the ‘Collectif des Associations Contre 
l’Impunité au Togo’ and the ‘Plateforme Citoyenne Justice et Vérité’ (PCJV), had 
advocated political reforms, warning that failure to implement them could lead to 
electoral violence. Nevertheless, a majority within the newly formed opposition 
coalition ‘Combat pour l’Alternance Politique en 2015’ (CAP 2015) was in favour of 
contesting the elections and supported Jean-Pierre Fabre, the leader of the main 
opposition party, the ‘Alliance Nationale pour le Changement’.  
The presidential elections took place on 25 April, with about 3.5 m people 
entitled to vote. The disputed electoral system stipulated that the president would be 
elected for a five-year term, the winner being the candidate with the most votes after a 
single round of voting. That is, the winner did not need to have an absolute majority in 
the first round, as stipulated by the controversial 2002 amendment to the constitution, 
which favoured the incumbent. Apart from the incumbent, Faure Gnassingbé, and the 
leading opposition candidate, Jean-Pierre Fabre, there were three other contestants from 
smaller opposition parties: Aimé T. Gogué of the ‘Alliance des Démocrates pour le 
Développement Intégral’, Gerry K. Taama, the leader of ‘Nouvel Engagement pour le 
Togo’, and Mohamed Tchassona Traoré of the ‘Mouvement Citoyen pour la Démocratie 
et le Développement’. Mediated by the international donor community, it was agreed to 
establish a supplementary steering committee with the CENI to follow the processing 
operations. The latter was to be composed of international election observers from the 
AU, ECOWAS, WAEMU, OIF, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, and an 
international electoral assistance commission of the Gorée Institute (a Pan African NGO 
based in Senegal, assisted by the francophone West African regional organisation 
Conseil de l’Entente and the EU) as well as representatives of the presidential 
candidates. 
After three days of quarrelling and tension within the Electoral Commission 
(‘Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante’; CENI), its president announced the 
results on 28 April – prematurely, as 28 of the 42 reports of the local electoral 
commissions had not yet been examined in plenary – and declared that Faure 
Gnassingbé had won an absolute majority with 58.8% of valid votes, against 35.2% for 
Jean-Pierre Fabre (CAP 2015) and 3% for Aimé T. Gogué. The unilateral decision of 
the ruling majority within the CENI on the early publication of results, mainly provoked 
by the drive of the majority to assure the inauguration of the president before the formal 
expiration of his mandate (3. May), put an abrupt end to the mediation attempts of the 
steering committee of international election observers. Nevertheless, AU, ECOWAS 
and UN observer missions declared the polls free and fair, despite opposition 
complaints on 30 April that irregularities had taken place. The ECOWAS chairman, the 
Ghanaian president John Dramani Mahama went even as far as declaring the 
presidentials ‘another milestone in the consolidation of democracy in the West African 
subregion’. A confidential report of an EU electoral mission, prepared between 12 
March and 7 May, which was leaked to the press on 26 October, confirmed these 
claims. The report recognised the generally peaceful conduct of the polls but criticised 
irregular high rates of voter registration (99.9% nationwide), based only on simple 
testimony, notably in the northern districts, where support for the incumbent had 
historically been high: Centrale and Kara-Binah (137%), Bassar (121%), Dankpen 
(177%), Doufelgou (117%), Kozah (114%), Kéran (109%) and Assoli (106%). 
Registration rates were significantly lower in regions considered to be the stronghold of 
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the opposition (especially the Maritime region). In addition, the reported voter turnout 
was higher in the north. According to the CENI, turnout was initially estimated at about 
53% nationwide, i.e. at least 10% lower than at the previous presidential elections in 
2010 (64%), but this was later adjusted to 61% without explanation. The fall in turnout 
compared with the previous polls was interpreted as a sign of growing voter fatigue, 
which may have been aggravated by the boycott called for by smaller opposition parties 
and a potentially high number of voters who could not cast their vote because of 
technical problems, especially in the Maritime region. On 3 May, the Constitutional 
Court ratified the result, which was not challenged by the CAP 2015 because it did not 
believe in the impartiality of the Court, given its composition and similar decisions in 
the past. The Electoral Integrity Project (Los Angeles) classified the presidentials (2015) 
as well as the legislative elections of 2013 in Togo at the bottom range (rank 161 and 
162 of 168) in its expert survey 2015 of 180 elections in 139 countries. 
Thus, Faure Gnassingbé easily secured a third five-year term in office and 
thereby the extension of the autocratic rule of the Gnassingbé family, which had already 
been in power for 48 years, a world record, topped only by North Korea, as pointed out 
by the international NGO ‘Tournons La Page’. The opposition had little opportunity to 
challenge the regime through democratic elections, given the extensive influence and 
material resources that were at the government’s disposal. Apart from the biased 
electoral system and the state-controlled media, the opposition was subjected to 
additional forms of judicial and financial repression, including a policy of divide and 
rule, combined with a carrot and stick strategy, and systematic weakening of the 
opposition’s local power base. The last had been effected by, among other things, the 
replacement of local mayors and communal councillors by special delegates nominated 
by the administration in 2001, and, most importantly, by the endless postponement of 
local elections since 1987, considered to be a pre-condition of a democratic 
legitimization of devolution of power. Thereby Togo remained the sole member within 
the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU/UEMOA) that did not 
implement an independent decentralization. Thus, in fear of a possible repetition of 
electoral violence in the aftermath of the 2005 presidentials, the ordinary voter had little 
choice between either voting for the ruling power or resignation and absenteeism.  
After the resignation of Prime Minister Ahoomey-Zunu on 22 May, the 
president appointed Selom Komi Klassou as the new premier on 5 June. The 55-year-old 
Klassou, an Ewe originating from Notsè, and regarded as a hardliner and long-time ally 
of the Gnassingbé regime, had been a member of the politbureau of the former unity 
party, the ‘Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais’ (the antecedent of the ruling UNIR), 
and had served as cabinet minister under both the late dictator Eyadéma and his son 
Faure. He had also been the campaign manager in the disputed 2005 presidential 
election, which had assured Faure’s succession to his late father Eyadéma on the latter’s 
death. On 28 June, Klassou announced his new cabinet, reduced from 26 to 23 
members. It included four women (a cutback from 26% in 2013 to 17%), including the 
third most important member of the government, Victoire Dogbé, director of the 
presidential cabinet, who kept her portfolio as minister of grassroots development, 
youth and youth employment. Twelve former cabinet members were reappointed, 
including Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Robert Dussey, and Minister of 
Security Colonel Yark Damehane. Adji Otèth Ayassor became the only minister of 
state, overseeing the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which now merged with the 
Planning Ministry and thus became a ‘super-ministry’. Gilbert Bawara, former minister 
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of territorial administration, became minister of labour and social dialogue, responsible 
for, among other things, relations with civil society organisations, including labour 
unions. Abli Bidamon, former chief of Togolese customs, was awarded the strategic 
Ministry of Mines and Energy in recognition of his loyal service in the CENI. The 
junior coalition partners, the ‘Union des Forces de Changement’ (UFC) and 
‘Convergence Patriotique Panafricaine’, kept the Ministries of Environment (André 
Johnson) and Higher Education (Octave Broohm), respectively, while the former 
foreign minister Elliot Ohin (UFC) was demoted to minister without portfolio to the 
prime minister. The Defence Ministry remained (as it had since 2008) in the hands of 
the president, apparently as precaution against possible coup attempts. 
All in all, Togo was still rated as an ‘authoritarian regime’ in the democracy 
index of the Economic Intelligence Unit (London). In the global ranking of the 
independent Democracy Ranking Association (Vienna) published on 29 December, 
Togo was ranked 110th of 113 countries. The population was becoming increasingly 
frustrated by the regime’s inability to initiate meaningful reforms. According to the 
World Database on Happiness (an index of subjective wellbeing), the Togolese came 
among the lowest of the 149 countries surveyed, and the UN World Happiness Report 
of 2015 ranked Togo as the lowest country worldwide, a drop since the previous report 
of 2005-7. According to a representative survey of Afrobarometer published in January 
about two third of the population held the opinion that the present electoral system does 
allow neither to vote the president out of office nor to vote for deputies who truly reflect 
the will of the electorate. Amnesty International (ai) and ACAT-France published a 
joint report in April titled ‘Togo: one decade of impunity’ proposing a road-map to end 
impunity, notably of members of the security forces. Nevertheless, AI recognized slight 
improvements of the human rights situation in its annual report on Togo published end 
of December, like the criminalization of torture in the new penal code adopted in 
parliament (2. Nov.). In contrast, the union of independent journalist complained about 
the drastically tightened sentences against diffusion of false news in the new code. 
The regime delayed the implementation of most of the recommendations for 
reform made by the CVJR in 2012. In March, the government established an ‘Haut 
Commissariat pour la Réconciliation et le Renforcement de l’Unité Nationale’, 
supplemented by a civil-society platform, the PCJV, in order to accelerate 
implementation. The National Human Rights Commission (‘Commission Nationale des 
Droits de l’Homme’; CNDH) complained of a lack of resources and of the 
government’s unwillingness to cooperate. A bill to improve the composition and 
organisation of the CNDH, particularly with respect to the prevention of torture, was 
adopted in Parliament in mid-October. On 31 December, the CNDH handed to the 
government its report on the violence that had ensued following a government attempt 
to implement a nature conservation project in Mango (Northern Togo) without due 
popular consultation. In November, the intervention of the army to quell the local 
population’s protests had resulted in eight deaths. AI and CAP 2015 activists called for 
an independent inquiry, the release of 11 persons detained in the Dapaong prison, and 
reparations for the families of the victims.  
In late December, the government adopted a bill for the creation of a response 
force composed of retired military personnel to improve national security. On 28 
December, another bill, providing guidelines for regional planning, was passed in 
parliament in order to enhance the national policy of comprehensive regional planning 
as enacted in the council of ministers in 2009. 
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Foreign Affairs  
 
At the ECOWAS summit in Accra (Ghana) on 19 May, the heads of state dropped a 
proposal to restrict West African presidents to serving two terms in office. Togo and 
Gambia, the only ECOWAS members who had not yet introduced the limit, were 
reportedly the driving forces behind the rejection of the proposal.  
Unlike in 2010, the EU did not send a delegation to observe the presidential 
elections because its recommendations concerning the previous 2010 and 2007 elections 
had not been implemented. However, the EU did assist the electoral process by, for 
example, co-funding 1,200 national election observers, a project launched by the 
‘Concertation Nationale de la Société Civile au Togo’, a network of 53 civil society 
organisations founded in 2002. Jérome Leyraud, an expert commissioned by the EU to 
monitor the elections, was expelled from the country shortly after his arrival in late 
March because of his critical remarks in a 2013 EU report on the parliamentary 
elections. Togolese Commissioner of Economy and Finance Adji Otèth Ayassor had 
already in February asked the resident representative of the IMF, WernerKeller, to leave 
the country ahead of schedule because of his outspoken criticism of the hesitant 
implementation of the IMFs recommendations. The IMF responded by announcing the 
temporary closure of his office in Lomé one month later. 
 In February, Germany provided € 245,000 for the formation and training of 
administrators and local leaders (prefects, village heads, etc.) within the framework of a 
UNDP programme in order to guarantee their political neutrality in the electoral 
process.  
At the Togolese government’s request, the OIF assigned a committee of experts 
to assist the CENI from 14 March to 8 April in drawing up the electoral register. At the 
end of its mission, the OIF stated that the electoral register was incomplete but could 
nevertheless be accepted because it was not contested by the opposition.  
 During an official visit to Lomé in March, UN Deputy Secretary General Jeffrey 
Feltman expressed his concern about standards of democracy and the transparency and 
credibility of elections. UNDP, among others, had supported the formation of an 8,000-
strong security force to oversee the presidential elections (‘Force Sécurité Elections 
Présidentielles’; FOSEP 2015). In June, the UN High Commission for Human Rights 
closed its office in Lomé, which had been founded in 2006 to tackle human rights issues 
arising from political violence during the 2005 presidential elections. On 11 February, a 
UN working group on Togo had sought in vain the release of Kpatcha Gnassingbé, the 
president’s half-brother, imprisoned in 2009 on charges of involvement in an alleged 
coup attempt, and of other prisoners facing the same charges, citing lack of evidence. 
Following the terrorist attack on the newspaper ‘Charlie Hebdo’, on 11 January, 
Faure Gnassingbé attended a gathering in Paris of 50 world leaders, who met to show 
their solidarity with France. He underlined that his presence was also to make his 
European colleagues understand that terrorism had to be countered worldwide and to 
make them aware that he considered it to be the same evil, even if it took different 
forms in Africa. On 15 December, Saudi Arabia announced the formation of an Islamic 
military alliance to fight terrorism. The initiative was explicitly not restricted to 
countering the so-called Islamic State, but was intended to combat all forms of terrorism 
worldwide, and included 34 member countries. Besides ten Islamic countries, including 
Autor’s extended version of: Kohnert, D. (2016): Togo. In: Abbink/Elischer/Mehler/Melber (eds.), Africa 
Yearbook. Vol. 12 – Politics, economy and society South of the Sahara in 2015. Leiden & Boston: Brill, 
2016: 174 - 181 
 
 6 
nations with large and established armies such as Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt, 20 
African countries joined the alliance, including Togo, Nigeria and Ivory Coast.   
At the end of September, Faure Gnassingbé addressed the 70th session of the 
UN General Assembly in New York on the progress made by his country in achieving 
the MDGs. Some days after the adoption of the new 17 sustainable development goals 
(SDGs), the UN selected Togo to host the first workshop of the working group of 
Francophone African countries to prepare for the implementation of the SDGs. 
According to the UN coordinator, Khardiata Lo N’Diaye, this was in recognition of 
Togo’s constructive role in preparing the new SDGs agenda up to 2030.  
After the abortive coup in Burkina Faso on 16 September, led by Gen. Gilbert 
Diendéré, the former chief of President Blaise Compaoré’s security guard, Cote d’Ivoire 
and Togo were accused of having supported the coup attempt, according to international 
press reports based on the preliminary findings of an investigative commission in 
Ouagadougou. 
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held its first summit on African soil in 
Johannesburg (South Africa) on 5 December. The summit was attended by most African 
leaders, including Faure Gnassingbé, who met Chinese President Xi Jinping one day 
before the opening. The latter praised the political and economic cooperation with Togo 
since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1972 and pledged to strengthen cooperation 
in infrastructure projects (roads and development of the Lomé port area as a 
transregional industrial hub), agriculture and the health sector. 
 
 
 
Socioeconomic Developments  
 
Real GDP growth remained strong because of public investment in national road 
networks, mining and port infrastructure, as well as productivity gains in agriculture and 
the recovery of global commodity prices. It had averaged 5.6% in 2013-14 and was 
projected to remain at this level up to 2018, with inflation staying well below the 
UEMOA convergence rate of 3%. Industry was the fastest growing sector, last but not 
least because of recent developments in the key clinker and cement production, 
including the huge Heidelberg Cement plant in Tabligbo, 80 km north-east of Lomé, 
which opened in March, with capacity for annual production of 1.5 m tonnes.  
Nevertheless, real GDP per capita remained below the UEMOA average and, 
importantly, growth was not inclusive. According to the latest available figures, income 
distribution had worsened (Gini coefficient increased from 0.36 to 0.39, 2006-11), and 
poverty remained high (although declining from 62% in 2006 to 59% in 2011) and,  
according to the IMF country report released in November, geographically concentrated 
in rural areas and the north. Moreover, the high level of public investment resulted in a 
visible increase in public debt, rising from 46% of GDP in 2012 to 58% in 2014, which 
the IMF viewed as unsustainable, although the current account deficit of recent years 
was projected to improve marginally to 12.5% in 2015 as result of lower oil prices.  
Secondary income, especially private remittances and donor grants continued to be 
vital for the balance of payments. About 2 m Togolese were living abroad – 1.5 m 
within Africa and about 500,000 overseas. Remittances from the Togolese diaspora 
played a significant role in development. According to OECD statistics for 2014, Togo 
ranked high on a global scale not only for ODA per capita ($ 91 in 2011, ranked 17th) 
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but also for remittances ($ 52 per capita, ranked 7th). Remittances had steadily 
increased by 7% over the previous decade and represented 8% of GDP or CFAfr 182 bn 
($ 333 m) in 2014.  
 Tax revenues were expected to rise to 16.8% of GDP in 2015 because of 
improved revenue collection, but the fiscal deficit was expected to widen from 4.5% of 
GDP (2014) to 5.1%. The increase was due to public expenditure apparently related to 
the elections. Against this background, the general budget for 2016, approved by 
Parliament on 30 December, was based on optimistic predictions. With 
CFAfr 1,002.2 bn (€ 1.524.5 m) in expenditure to be set against CFAfr 962,8 bn in 
revenue (of which CFAfr 575 bn was projected internal revenue, compared with 
CFAfr 480 bn in 2014), the budget deficit of CFAfr 39.4 bn was to be financed mainly 
from extraordinary revenue. 
Several road projects to improve national and trans-national trade flows were 
agreed upon in May. They included the upgrading of the vital transit axis Lomé–
Ouagadougou that connected the deep-water port of Lomé not only with projected 
mining areas in northern Togo but also with the landlocked neighbouring countries of 
Niger and Burkina Faso, thus improving Togo’s role as a major commercial and 
transportation hub within West Africa.  
Apart from public works, private commercial investments were also implemented. A 
fertiliser plant managed by the ‘Compagnie des Intrants Agricoles du Togo’, a branch of 
the French Mambo Group, began production in the port area of Lomé in June with an 
installed capacity of 400,000 tonnes per year. It was to profit from the nearby phosphate 
mines, like an even bigger $ 1.4 bn phosphate mining and fertilisers project with a 
nominal annual production of 3 m tonnes of phosphate rock concentrates, 500,000 
tonnes of phosphoric acid, and 1.3 m tonnes of fertiliser, using energy supplied by the 
new West African Gas Pipeline. This huge project was the biggest of its kind in West 
Africa and was contracted in September between the government and a consortium of 
the Israel-based Elenilto and the Chinese state-owned Wengfu. Based in Kpémé near 
Lomé, it would significantly contribute upon completion in 2018 to Togo’s main export 
(phosphates represented 11% of total exports in 2014) and to the resurgence in 
exploration and development of the sixth-largest phosphate mine in Africa. However, 
notwithstanding the recovery of the ailing phosphate production, which had increased 
by 9% to 1.2 m tonnes in 2014, equipment constraints slowed down production, and 
operational accidents and strikes affected the production of clinker and cement.  
Cotton production, a major export earner, increased by 45% from 77,850 tonnes of 
cotton grain in the previous season (2013-14) to 113,000 tonnes in 2014-15, thanks to 
good weather and the government project to improve the agricultural sector (‘Projet 
d’Appui au Secteur Agricole’; PASA) with an investment of $ 75.5 m over six years. 
The PASA particularly emphasised cash crops, such as cotton, cacao and palm oil and 
the government tried to reduce dependency on some 18,000 tonnes of imported palm oil 
by assisting the Mauritanian company Kaylan Agrovet Investments to plant some 
52,000 palm trees on 250 ha at Agou (south-west Togo), to be extended to 1,000 ha by 
2016. The group invested $ 65 m, including for the construction of an oil-mill with an 
annual capacity of 24,000 tonnes of oil by 2022. The coffee harvest was expected to 
yield 11,000 tonnes by the end of the cropping season, compared with 5,000 tonnes 
before the start of the PASA.  
The business climate improved considerably. According to the 2015 Doing Business 
Report, Togo’s country ranking improved by 15 places from 164th in 2014 to 149th, the 
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third-best improvement worldwide, although starting from bottom place. Its rating in the 
Heritage Foundation’s index of economic freedom also improved, by 3.1 points from 
2014, resulting in Togo being ranked 138th of 166 countries worldwide and 30th of 46 
countries in SSA.  
On occasion of the annual Ramadan festivities on 17 July, El Hadj Inoussa 
Bouraïma, president of the most important Togolese Muslim organisation, the ‘Union 
Musulmane du Togo’, warned of the ambitions of terrorist groups to propagate Islam by 
violent means and declared that jihadis had no place in Togolese society. Although 
there had been no history of Islamist terrorism in Togo, the faithful who had gathered 
for the festival in Kégué stadium in Lomé were, for the first time, searched by security 
forces. 
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